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COUNTY DEBT DIFFICULTIES IN KENTUCKY
(Continued from January, 1943 Issue)
GLENN D.

II.

MORROW*

CouNTY DEBT ADMINISTRATION DIpp'0ULTMnS

02

Although counties may refinance their debts without state
assistance,' 0 3 most counties are electing to follow the procedure
outlined m the County Debt Act of 1938.104
Brokers and bond houses generally have encouraged counties
to seek the assistance of the local finance officer m reorganizing
* Research Assistant, Bureau of Business Research, University
of Kentucky (1941) and Field Representative, Local Finance
Unit, Kentucky Department of Revenue (1942); A.B., 1933, Murray
State Teachers College; M.A., 1940, George Peabody College for
Teachers; public school teacher, 1933-1941, author with Professor
James W Martin of Organzzation for Kentucky Local Tax Assessments, University of Kentucky, 1941, and with Orba F Traylor of
State Liquor Monopoly or Przvate Licensing, Kentucky Legislative
Council, 1942.
The writer is particularly indebted to Professor James W
Martin, Director of the Bureau of Business Research, University of
Kentucky, for his guidance in the preparation of the article, for
numerous suggestions relative to its content, and for editorial assistance. Acknowledgment is also due Dr. Harry Lynn, State Local
Finance Officer, Kentucky Department of Revenue, Frankfort, Kentucky; Mr. Amos H. Eblen, Law Offices of Smith and Leary, Frankfort, Kentucky; Messrs. Ernest Woodward and Franklin P. Hays,
Law Offices of Woodward, Dawson and Hobson, Louisville, Kentucky; and Judge Richard Priest Dietzman, Louisville, Kentucky, who
kindly reviewed and criticized the unfinished manuscript. The
writer also wishes to explain that nothing in the article reflects
any views of the Department of Revenue; it was written while he
was not associated with the Department.
' Discussion of county debt administration difficulties, for
practical purposes, may be limited to problems confronting bondholders, the state local finance officer, and county officials in refinancing existing debts; since a $100,000 Campbell County road and
bridge bond issue is the only original county bond issue floated since
enactment of the County Debt Act in 1938.
' Some of the bonds of Christian, Henry, Crittenden, Knox,
Graves, and possibly other counties have been floated without the
assistance of the local finance officer.
'Acts 1938, 1st ex. sess., chap. 31 (effective Apr. 20, 1938),
Baldwin's Ky. Stats. (1939 Supp.), sec. 938q; Ky. Rev. Stats., sees.
12.020, 66.210, 66.280-.390, 66.990, 68.210-.220, 68.250, 68.270-.290,
68.310-.320, 68.370, 68.990. If original issues are floated, these have
to be approved by the local finance officer if the amount exceeds
0.5 per cent of the assessed value of the county. Baldwin's Ky.
Stats. (1939 Supp.), sec. 938q-4; Ky. Rev. Stats., sees. 66.210, 66.310.
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their debt structures and in some instances have even demanded
that they do so as a condition of handling refunding issues.10 5
Bond houses, owing to the bulk of county issues being
composed of long-term, non-callable bonds which can be refinanced only with the holders' assent, are in a peculiarly
advantageous position to influence clients to withhold assent in
exchanging their bonds and can bring considerable pressure on
county officials to refinance indebtedness under the provisions
of the County Debt Act. Furthermore, except for the reluctance
of some counties to place their sinlng funds under state
administration, as required by the County Debt Act if refinancing is under its provisions, there is little articulate objection to
state assistance.1 06 Generally, counties have welcomed the
cooperation of an official state finance expert.
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

The local finance officer is required by law to withhold
approval of any issue or re-issue of bonds if, among other considerations, "it appears that the bonds or the issuance thereof
will be invalid.' i07 Considerable ambiguity exists in this
particular phrase of the statute. The Constitution clearly
prohibits the existence of any courts in Kentucky except those
of constitutional creation,10 8 but the statute appears to imply
that the local finance officer and the county debt commission,
which is required to review decisions of the local finance officer,
are in some instances to function in a quasi-juicial capacity
Neither has ever known whether it is to determine the validity
of bonds to be refinanced as would a court or merely to ascertain
as an administrative finding of fact whether the form and
manner of their issuance were in compliance with requirements
of law.10 9 The question has never been judicially determined so
'Correspondence
with all bond houses which have handled
Kentucky county bonds indicates they intend to continue this
practice.
I' A canvass of all local newspapers in counties where the local
finance officer has approved bond issues shows a singular paucity of
adverse criticism.
7Acts 1938, 1st ex. sess., chap. 31, Baldwin's Ky. Stats. (1939
Supp.), sec. 938q-4; Ky. Rev. Stats., secs. 66.210, 66.310 as amended
by Acts 1942, chap. 179, sec. 2, p. 762.
' Sec. 135.
1 See appellees' petition for extension of opinion in Morgan
County v. Governor of Kentucky, 288 Ky 532, 156 S. W (2d) 498

(Oct. 14, 1941, extended Dec. 9, 1941).
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as to'remove all doubt. The principle announced in County Debt
Commssron v Morgan County"0 was followed in Morgan
County v. Governor of Kentucky when the Court said.
'The provision of Section 839q-4 (938q-4) of the Statutes that
the decision of the Local Finance Officer or the Commission as to the
legality of a bond issue shall be 'res adjudicata in any subsequent
case or cases raising such question of legality' is construed to mean
'final' in
respect to the finding of fact by the administrative
offlcers., ,in
But in EstiNl County v. County Debt Comm'sswn the Court
remarked, in commenting on the statutory requirement that the
approval of the local finance officer must be obtained before a
county may contract an indebtedness in excess of 0.5 per cent
of its taxable property, that "the legislative power to regulate
procedure does not offend the constitutional provisions relating
to debt limitations.' '112 Clearly, these decisions do not determine
definitely the nature and scope of inquiries to be made by the
local finance officer. At present, he has taken a conservative
position and has insisted that "when legal questions for wich
there is no clear answer arise in connection with bonds winch
he is asked to approve, such questions should be resolved
by the courts."'s This attitude is postulated on the assumption
that "the courts alone are competent to make definitive interpretations of the law.""14 Whether such a policy is justifiable is
open to question. No doubt refinancing has been done on a safe,
conservative basis, but unconscionable delays, much litigation,
and considerable expense in refinancing have resulted. It may
be that the position taken is the only sane and constructive
position that could have been taken, since the principal objective
of the County Debt Act is to afford counties an opportunity to
refinance their indebtedness on a fiscally constructive and sound
legal basis, and, if this is to be achieved, the primary responsibility for establishing the validity of existing debts must rest on
the counties concerned. To the contrary, however, responsible
financial institutions are critical of the policy, maintaining that
it has served to arouse rather than to allay fears and has lessened
=279 Ky. 476, 483, 130 S. W (2d) 779, 782 (1939).
in288 Ky. 532, 535, 156 S. W (2d) 498, 500 (1941)
286 Ky. 114, 118, 149 S. W (2d) 735, 737 (1941.)

InH Clyde Reeves, Report of the State Local Finance Officer
(1941),p. 8.
"'Id.at p. 13.

COUNTY DEBTS IN KENTUCKY

the confidence of the investing public generally in the financial
integrity of Kentucky municipalities. 1 5
DIFIcuLTIEs

iN

ADMiNISTERING REFINANCING

OPERATIONS

To appreciate current difficulties of administermg refinancing operations in Kentucky, legal difficulties must be considered
along with local admnnstrative inefficiency and the prevailing
character of local indebtedness.
Inefficiency of local administratwn.-Several influences are
responsible for fiscal mismanagement in Kentucky counties. The
propensity to incur obligations in excess of revenue receipts,
especially during election years, suggests inadequate adinmstrative control by local officials over county financial affairs.
Though outright abuse of authority is sometimes evident, general diffusion of responsibility among county officials and lack
of proper encumbrance accounting records are primarily responsible for the failure of most counties to observe sound
budgetary practices. The free and easy spending during the
1920's and the large floating debts that were accumulated indicate that county officials sometimes exercised bad financial judgment. Similarly, the widespread diversion, improper investment,
and dissipation of county sinking funds, though perhaps
occasionally attributable to outright malfeasance, suggest
generally the need for expert technical assistance and financial
supervision.
The incompetence with which the finances of many counties
have been managed may be observed in the following comments
of the Court of Appeals.
"All persons having any knowledge of county affairs must recognize that many counties of the state are in a deplorable financial condition due to improvident spending during the last three decades and
due to the unbusmess-like manner in which their fiscal affairs have
been handled.
It had almost become a custom (prior to enactment of the County Debt Act of 1938) for suits to be filed where
those attacking the validity of the indebtedness of a county desired
the indebtedness upheld, and the attack thereon was a mere. sham.
Oftentimes, the allegations of their pleadings and their proof were
so made as to present the appearance that the indebtedness was
valid when in reality it was not.""
'This attitude has been ascertained from correspondence with
all financing institutions which have had experience with Kentucky
county bonds and with many institutions which, though not having
had such experience, are mn a position to observe the situation.
" County Debt Commission v. Morgan County, 279 Ky. 476, 482,
130 S. W (2d) 779, 782 ,(1939). Cf. James W Martin, "State Supervision of County Finance in Kentucky," 28 National Municipal Review 249 (Feb. 1939).
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Basically, the financial plight of most counties is a result of
the indiscriminate accumulation of floating debts, wluch have
either been funded or are being carried over from year to year.
In either instance they must be serviced out of general fund
revenues, which are frequently inadequate both to retire the outstanding debt and to provide for the necessary functioning of
county government. This is true despite the fact that as of June
30, 1940, road and bridge bonds accounted for about 90 per cent
of the aggregate bonded indebtedness of Kentucky counties.
Payment of principal and interest on the latter is restricted to
a special levy, and the bonds may be refunded at maturity Consequently, their retirement does not necessarily interfere with
general fund revenues.
Character of local vndebtedness.--The most limiting characteristic of Kentucky county bonds, as far as refinancing operations and the investing public are concerned, is their doubtful
validity, especially those issued prior to 1932. Until then there
was no requirement that bond issues should be reviewed by
either the judiciary or a state admnistrative agency, and, as a
consequence, the bulk of Kentucky county bonds have been
issued solely on the authority of fiscal court orders. The incompetence of county fiscal courts to deal successfully with technicalities of funding operationsii 7 and the occasional shady
practices incident to the manner in wnch bonds were issuedZ 8
have made sound refunding exceedingly difficult and, in some
instances, virtually impossible. Ascertaining the validity of
original non-voted funding bonds is further complicated by the
questionable character of floating debts that were funded. Frequently, county records and recitals of facts contained m bond
resolutions are absolute contradictions. In this connection, as
was observed earlier, the local finance officer has remarked that
"few funding bond issues antedating 1932 will bear close
scrutiny "i19
"'
See, for example, character of claims made and evidence presented in Denton v. Pulaski County, 170 Ky. 33, 185 S. W 481 (1916)

Pendleton v. Letcher County Fiscal Court, 194 Ky. 688, 240 S. W 358
(1922), Payne, Individually, etc. v. Fiscal Court of Carlisle County,
200 Ky. 41, 252 S. W 127 (1923).

'County Debt Commission v. Morgan County, 279 Ky. 476,
482, 30 S. W (2d) 779, 782 (1939), Fulton County Fiscal Court v.

Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 36, 146 S. W
(2d) 15, 25 (1940), same, 289 Ky. 159, 158 S. W (2d) 420 (1942).
'Reeves, op. cit., p. 13.
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Other characteristics of county bonds winch have caused
considerable refinancing difficulties may be noted briefly During the 1920's, when most county bonds were issued, there was
no official financial expert in the state to advise with local officials, and technical assistance was afforded voluntarily by interested financing institutions. Counties were influenced generally to issue those particular types of bonds currently marketable. Since long-term, non-callable bonds were about the
only type of bonds carrying an interest rate below the 5 per cent
statutory maximum wnch could be sold above par (also required
by statute), the preponderance of the outstanding indebtedness
of Kentucky counties is represented by tins type of bond. Likewise, but few of the early bonds contained any provision respecting negotiability, and maturity dates usually were not arranged
to harmonize with county financial convemence. Such considerations make refinancing all the more desirable but extremely
difficult.
LEGAL PROBLEMS

Proration of available funds.-One question to winch a clear
answer has been given relates to the rights of non-assenting
bondholders in refinancing operations. This is exceedingly nnportant, since virtually all outstanding bond issues are noncallable and refunding is necessarily contingent on the voluntary
assent of bondholders to the exchange. If a few bondholders
who steadfastly refuse to agree to the terms of any refunding
plan could defeat refinancing operations, effort to relieve the
county debt situation would often be nullified.
The question of prorating available funds between assenting
and non-assenting bondholders arose in connection with one of
the first refunding issues the local finance officer was called on
to approve. McLean County proposed to refinance $185,000 of
road and bridge bonds by exchanging renewal bonds. At the
time, $45,000 of these were in default. The county was without
funds to retire the matured bonds or to pay the interest due on
the entire issue. A majority of the holders of outstanding bonds
were willing to exchange them for refunding bonds, but a few
holders of past-due bonds declined to make the exchange and
contended they were entitled to payment of principal and interest in full before provisions were made for payment of unmatured bonds.
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The refinancing plan worked out by the local finance officer
and McLean County provided that should holders tender less
than 100 per cent of the outstanding bonds in exchange for renewal bonds, all funds on hand and which would accrue to the
county for the purpose of paying principal and interest on
voted road and bridge bonds should be prorated between holders
of unexchanged and renewal bonds. Two sinkmg funds were to
be maintained, one, for the payment of interest and principal of
unexchanged bonds, the other, for the payment of interest and
principal of renewal bonds, together with accrued interest on the
bonds tendered for exchange and cancellation. Proration was
provided for on the following basis (a) From the funds on
hand an amount sufficient to pay all interest accrued to the last
interest payment date preceding the date of exchange was to be
set aside. The interest due on both the unexchangd bonds and
those tendered in exchange for renewal bonds was to be allocated
to their respective sinking funds for their amortization. (b) The
residue of available funds and all road and bridge bond funds
which would accrue to the county was to be allocated to the
respective sinking funds for amortizing the unexehanged and
renewal bonds in the same ratio which the par principal of each,
as of the date the exchange was completed, bore to the par prin12
cipal amount of both. 0
The Court of Appeals on June 21, 1940, upheld the proration plan because "the principle that equality is equity dictates the approval of the plan which, while deferring payment
in full to some, insures, within the limits of human foresight,
the ultimate payment in full to all. ' 121 Subsequently, on
August 8, 1940, this same principle was approved by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in
the case of Whitley County v. Farmers and Mechanics Savngs
Bank.122
Certain features of the proration plan are commendable, but
it gives rise to administrative difficulties and discrmnnation
=Epley v. County Debt Commission, 283 Ky.600, 604, 142 S.W
(2d) 116, 118 (1940).
Id at 606, 142 S.W (2d) at 118. See, also, Maccabees v. City
of Ashland, 270 Ky. 86, 91, 109 S. W (2d) 29, 32 (1940) and the

extensive annotations in90 A. L. R.717.
" Judgment and Order of Distribution in cause No. 1619 in
Equity, U. S.Dist. Ct. (E.D. Ky.Aug.8,1940.) The proration plan
has been used in refinancing road and bridge bonds of Whitley, Bell,
and Breckinridge counties and is to be used in others.
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among bondholders. Where proration is possible, a small group
of bondholders cannot defeat entirely the refinancing of a county's debt, but, where proration must be resorted to, complicated
bookkeeping inevitably results. Likewise, two amortization
plans may work injustices to some holders, as the original rights
of clannants are necessarily modified.
Voluntary bankruptcy.-Refinancmg is virtually impossible
in some counties even though available funds may be prorated,
since one particular bondholder owns a large proportion of the
outstanding bonds and has steadfastly refused to assent to any
refinancing plan which promises to reduce in any manner his
pecuniary interests. 2 8 The Federal Bankruptcy Act offers
some inducement to these counties to reorganize their debt structure under its provisions, as compliance by non-assenting holders
becomes compulsory if holders of not less than 66 2/3 per cent
of the bonds affected voluntarily assent to the refinancing plan.
In September, 1940, Perry County-probably the first in America-filed a voluntary petition of bankruptcy in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, but jurisdiction was denied in the absence of enabling state legislation.1 24
The 1942 General Assembly, however, has enacted legislation
authorizing any taxing agency or instrumentality entitled to
relief under the Bankruptcy Act on approval of the refinancing
plan by the local finance officer to petition the federal courts for
the composition of its debts. 1 25 This affords an additional opportunity to a few counties to reorgamze their debt structures
1 6
that heretofore have been effectively denied this privilege.
Perussible maturity dates.&-Another question which has
retarded refunding operations relates to permissible maturities of
refunding bonds. Section 157a of the Constitution contains no
provisions respecting the length of time for which road and
bridge bonds may be issued. The enabling legislation1 27 specified that the bonds should mature within 30 years. On the other
hand, section 159 of the Constitution provides that county bonds
must mature within not more than 40 years. Contradictory inReeves, op. cit., p. 10.

Reeves, op. cit., p. 9; Floyd County Times, Prestonsburg, Ky.,

Sept. 26, 1940.

'Acts 1942, Chap. 146, p. 621, Ky. Rev. Stats., Sec. 66.400.
1U. S. C. A. Tit. II, sec. 303.

'Acts 1914, chap. 80, sec. 21, p. 338; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936),
sec. 4307; Ky. Rev. Stats., secs. 178.010, 178.170.
L. J.-4
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terpretations of the constitutional basis underlying the statutory limitation of 30 years have been given. One line of reasoning considers the 40-year constitutional limitation as merely establishmg a maximum beyond which the legislature is not free
to exercise discretion;128 another holds the constitutional provision to be mandatory on the legislature and that the general
assembly is powerless to limit or otherwise modify its application. 129 In the most recent case, involving the competence of the
legislature to fix a maxmum time limit for the indebtedness of
a local taxing district less than the maxnum stated in the Constitution, the Court of Appeals held section 4307 of the statutes
to be unconstitutional, thus removing the 30-year limitation
which allegedly conflicted with the 40-year constitutional limitation.130
Prior to the decision in the Estill County case, the Court of
Appeals had upheld the constitutionality of the statute limiting
the maximum maturity date of voted road and bridge bonds to
30 years.isi Relying on the former decision the state local
finance officer, prior to 1940, refused to approve any road and
bridge bond refunding issue where property values at the time
the proposed reissue was to be floated would not justify reasonable anticipation that the bonds could be retired in 30 years. The
earlier decision delayed refinancing in some counties but made
it possible for other counties to refinance voted road and bridge
bonds at reduced interest rates. The latter decision will prevent refinancing at reduced interest rates in some counties butwill enable other counties with heavy bond obligations to re'Clere

v. Board of Education of the City of Ashland, 211 Ky.

130, 133, 277 S. W 335, 336 (1925), County Debt Commission v.

Morgan County, 279 Ky. 476, 481, 130 S. W (2d) 779, 782 (1939).
City of Winchester v. Nelson, 175 Ky. 63, 72, 193 S. W 1040,
1044 (1917), Harris v. City of Morganfield, 201 Ky. 588, 592, 257
S. W 1032, 1034 (1924), Fox v. Boyle County, 245 Ky. 27, 30, 53
S. W (2d) 192, 194 (1932), Williams v. City of Raceland, 245 Ky.
212, 218, 53 S. W (2d) 370, 373 (1932), Wheeler v. Board of Comnussioners of the City of Hopkinsville, 245 Ky. 388, 398, 53 S. W
(2d) 740, 744 (1932).
'Estill County v. County Debt Commission, 286 Ky. 114, 117,
149 S. W (2d) 735, 737 (1941).
1 County Debt Commission v. Morgan County, 279 Ky. 476, 481,
130 S. W (2d) 779, 782 (1939). The 30-year time limitation was
not directly before the Court; but in deciding another question the

Constitution was construed as establishing a limit beyond which the
legislature could not go, although a lower limit could be established
by legislative action.

CouNTn
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finance their debts, as greater indebtedness can be liquidated
over a 40-year period than m 30 years.
The Estill County case will also reduce substantially the
number of bonds of doubtful validity because of overissue. The
Court has consistently held invalid voted road and bridge bonds
issued in excess of maximum amounts permitted by section 157a
of the Constitution.1 32 Since most road and bridge bonds were
issued under the 30-year limitation in section 4307 of the statutes, extension of the limitation to 40 years permits a greater
amount of bonds to be retired from the proceeds of the 20-cent
levy
In a few aggravated situations, even with substantial acceptance of reduced interest rates by bondholders, the 40-year
limitation will not permit satisfactory refinancing except insofar
as bondholders are willing to accept an arrangement of maturity
dates winch will again call for refunding a substantial proportion of the bonds at the expiration of the 40-year period. There
is currently little hope of an immediate solution in these counties. The state is powerless to abrogate or otherwise alter contractual rights of non-assenting bondholders. The federal government only has jurisdiction of bankruptcy It may be necessary for a few counties to compose their debts under the Federal
Bankruptcy Act, postpone payment over a considerable period
of years, or else remain indefinitely in default.
Negotiability.-Probably no issue illustrates better the
varying and inconsistent decisions of the Court of Appeals than
that respecting the negotiability of Kentucky county bonds in
general, 133 and road and bridge bonds in particular. The Unform Negotiable Instruments Act 3 4 provides that negotiable instruments must contain.
"An unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money.
mA question arises in this connection which has not been

judicially determined. What position would the Court take with
respect to bond issues which were within constitutional limitations
when they were floated but which, owing to reduced assessments, are
currently in excess of such limitations?
'Though
the negotiability of general fund bonds has never
been adjudicated, if road and bridge bonds could be held nonnegotiable because resources for their payment were limited to the
20-cent levy, is it not reasonable to assume that general fund bonds
might be held non-negotiable because payment is restricted to the
50-cent levy, especially since county general expenditures must also
be met from these same funds?

'Acts 1904, chap. 102, secs. 1, 3, p. 213; Carroll's Ky. Stats.
(1936), secs. 3720b-1, 3720b-3; Ky. Rev. Stats., secs. 356.001, 356.003.
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However
"An unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional within
the meaning of the act, though (there is) coupled with it:
"(1) An indication of a particular fund out of winch

reimbursement is to be made, or a particular account to be
debited with the amount; or
"(2) A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the
instrument.
"But an order or promise to pay out of a particular fund is not

unconditional."
Practically all Kentucky county road and bridge bonds purport to pledge the "full faith and credit of the county" for their
payment. The question then arises as to whether tins constitutes
an unconditional promise to pay The answer necessarily turns
on the construction given sections 157 and 157a of the Constitution, but the construction of these provisions has not been such
as to determine definitely a county's liability Certain decisions
indicate that a county's liability is limited to revenues derived
from the special 20-cent levy authorized by section 157a, while
others just as assuredly indicate that a county's liability is not so
limited.
Beginning in 1915 with Mitchell v Knox County Fiscal
Court,185 counties have been permitted, but not required, to
supplement the 20-cent levy with additional general fund
levies. 1 6 Though the Court has continued to hold that a county
may not be required to apply any revenue derived from any
source other than the special 20-cent levy to the payment of road
and bridge bonds, the question has been in each instance not
whether liability of the county was limited by the 20-cent levy,
but whether the county could incur indebtedness in excess of
what the 20-cent levy would amortize. Certain considerations,
however, indicate a county's liability is not so restricted.
Indebtedness incurred under section 157a of the Constitution is referred to as "additional indebtedness," and the 20-cent
165 Ky. 543, 554, 177 S. W 279, 284 (1915).
See Bird v. Asher, 170 Ky. 726, 730, 186 S. W 663, 665 (1916);
Collier v. Bourbon Fiscal Court, 188 Ky. 491, 497, 223 S. W 149, 151
(1920), Hughes v. Eison, 190 Ky. 661, 666, 228 S. W 676, 678 (1921)
Smith v. Livingston County, 195 Ky. 382, 391, 242 S. W 612, 617
(1922), Payne v. Fiscal Court of Carlisle County, 200 Ky. 41, 43,
252 S. W 127, 129 (1923), Knox County v. Newport Culvert Co.,
248 Ky. 661, 664, 59 S. W (2d) 558, 559 (1933), Gillis v. Anderson,
256 Ky. 472, 481, 76 S. W (2d) 279, 284 (1934), Whitley County v.
Hermann, 263 Ky. 440, 444, 92 S. W (2d) 797, 799 (1936), Pulaski
County v. Ben Hur Life Association, 286 Ky. 119, 133, 149 S. W (2d)
"

8

738, 747 (1941)
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levy is "permitted in addition to" the general taxxmg power
allowed in section 157 The implication here certainly supports
the mew that road and bridge bonds constitute an additional
obligation not separate and distinct from the general indebted37
ness of the county In Bird v. WilsonM
it was held that a
county could incur a general indebtedness under section 157 in
the form of road and bridge bonds not to exceed the 2 per cent
limit imposed by section 158. Then, in Hughes v. Eison,138 section 157a was regarded as being in effect a part of section 157
and as enlarging and extending its provisions. -herein, then,
lies the distinction between voted road and bridge bonds issued
under the authority of section 157 and those issued under section
157a of the Constitution? Three differences are apparent. (a)
One concerns the requisite majority of votes to authorize the
respective issues. But this distinction stems from judicial construction and not from either constitutional or statutory provisions. (b) An unlimited tax may be levied to pay the principal and interest of bonds formerly issued under section 157 139
(c) Subsequent to Mitchell v. Knox County140 in 1915 and prior
to Bird v. Asher141 in 1916 road and bridge bonds could be
issued under section 157a in amounts not exceeding the 2 per
cent assessed value limitation in section 158 without regard to
the 20-cent tax rate limitation. 142 Recent decisions of the Court
indicate that the validity of bonds purchased on the faith of the
Mitchell v. Knox County decision will be upheld. 43
In the absence- of something indicating the contrary, courts
have held that the power to incur indebtedness implies the power
to assume personal liability 1 44 "All obligations incurred un171 Ky. 807, 809, 188 S. W 899, 900 (1916).
190 Ky. 661, 664, 228 S. W 676, 677 (1921). See, to the contrary, Whitley County v. Hermann, 263 Ky. 440, 444, 92 S. W (2d)
797, 799 (1936).

'City of Winchester v. Nelson, 175 Ky. 63, 70, 193 S. W 1040,
10431 (1917).
165 Ky. 543, 557, 177 S. W 279, 285.
14170 Ky. 726, 186 S. W 663.

Bell County is at present levying an additional 25-cent tax for
this purpose and has been upheld in doing so by the Circuit Court

of the 26th District.

1' See, for instance, Ballard County v. Kentucky County Debt
Commission, 290 Ky. 770, 773, 162 S.W (2d) 771, 773 (1942).
" Hunter v. City of Louisville, 208 Ky. 326, 328, 270 S.W 841,

842 (1925); Carter County v. Stinton, 120 U. S.517, 525, 7 Sup. Ct.
650, 30 Law. Ed. 701, 703 (1887), Scotland County v. Hill, 140 U. S.

41, 35 Law. Ed. 351 (1891); 44 C. J.1231.
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der Section 157 of the Constitution to which the indebtedness
authorized by Section 157a are (is) added had before its adoption and has (have) since been regarded as general in nature
and binding upon the county as a municipal entity "145 Following this line of reasoning, winch is supported by precedent in
both Kentucky and federal decisions, the federal court in
Pulaski,County v. Eichstaedt146 regarded references in bond recitals to the Constitution and statutes to be only an indication
of the fund out of winch they were to be paid. Thus, when the
Court.was called on in Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Assoca147
tion
to determine the negotiable character of bonds pledging
the full faith and credit of the county for payment, precedents
existed for holding section 157a of the Constitution as being a
collateral source of payment and not limiting the obligation of
the county When the question first came before the Court of
Appeals, the identical bond issue was involved which the federal
courts in Pulaskz County v. Eichstaedt previously had held
negotiable. The Court of Appeals, however, declined to follow
its own precedents and those set by federal courts and declared
the bonds to be non-negotiable.
Because of the tremendous impact of the Pulaski County
decision on county refinancing and also because of its probable
future implications, it might be well to discuss briefly the reasoning employed and to note some of the social and economic
consequences.
Reasoning of the original Pulaski County deeswn.-For
bonds to be negotiable the Court in its original opmon reasoned.
"It is the possibility of msufficiency of the fund rather than the

the
probability of sufficiency that determines the question whether
1 8
promise itself is contingent and therefore unconditional."

It seems clear, as was contended in appellees' brief for reI Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Association, 286 Ky. 119,
135, 149 S. W (2d) 738, 746 (1941). Contrast this reasoning with
the holding of the case that, though payment of road and bridge
bonds is limited to a restricted fund, liability extends indefinitely
in time; therefore, there exists an unlimited liability.
1,6 110 F (2d) 79, 80 (E. D. Ky. 1940).
Also, see Commissioner
of Cleveland v. Cleveland County Bank, 157 N. C. 191, 72 S. E.996
(1911).
14286 Ky 119, 149 S. W (2d) 738 (1941).
' Reprinted at p. 112 in Appellees' Petition for Rehearing.
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hearing, "it is the presence or absence of liability and not
any certainty of payment that makes the paper negotiable.' 1 49
As to the sufficiency of payment the Court relied heavily on
Bird v. Asher and had tns to say
"Sections 4307, 4307b-1, et seq., Statutes, make it (See. 157a of
Const.) operative and regulate the counties in relation thereto. The
amendment and the statutes establish an independent system or
mode for financing road construction and improvement. The indebtedness is not to be included in the aggregate county indebtedness. It may be in addition to the amount otherwise and elsewhere
A county cannot be required to
limited by the Constitution.
although it is permissible for it to do
use -any other revenue
so out of its general revenue derived from the regular fifty cents tax
long authorized by Section 157 of the Constitution and Section 1882
of the Statutes."'
From this construction of the Constitution and Negotiable
Instruments Act the following conclusion was reached.
"The provisions in the bonds that the 'full faith, credit and resources of said county are hereby irrevocably pledged' to secure the
payment must be read in connection with the Constitution and
statute therein referred to. When it is so read it can only mean that
the faith and credit of the county is pledged to the extent of the
resources to be derived from and under the provisions of the Constitution and statutes designated as they have been construed by this
Court.

We think it manifest, therefore, that these bonds are

to be deemed payable exclusively out of a special restricted fund,
and the promise of payment is contingent upon the sufficiency of
money to be raised by the special annual levy."'
The immediate nmpact of the orgsnal dectston.-The immediate repercussions of the Court's original decision, rendered
October 8, 1940, were of far-reachng social, political, and economic significance. These reverberations have not yet entirely
subsided. Certain issues theretofore unquestioned were brought
forcibly to the public's attention and probably await future
clarification.
The most immediate effect of the decision was to extend to
counties a hope that they would be relieved from payment of
approximately three-fourths of a million dollars of road and
bridge bonds immediately involved in the Caldwell and Company 52 debacle. Webster County had previously attempted to
recover the uncollected portions of its bond proceeds from
"Id, at p. 69.
Id,at p. 114.
Id. at p. 116.
"A bankrupt banking institution of Nashville, Tennessee, which
had marketed the bonds and with whom the proceeds had been left
on deposit. Several other counties were defrauded of their bond
proceeds similarly deposited.
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county officials responsible for the sales to Caldwell and Company; 1 53 and Breckinridge County, within twenty days after
the Pulaski decision, had moved to refuse payment and had
employed counsel for its defense.154 But the adverse effects of
the decision were not limited to the bonds of these three counties. Approximately 100 other counties had bonds outstanding
amounting to over $20,000,000. The negotiability of these had
never been questioned and the effect of the decision was to destroy an important feature of their marketability Overnight
the asked price for Kentucky county bonds dropped around
thirty points with no takers. 55 At the tune several counties
were in default on their road and bridge bond obligations and
several other counties were threatened with default. Refinancing in these counties or the issuance of original road and bridge
bonds would have been a virtual impossibility had the original
decision of the Court been permitted to stand. Counties are restricted by statute from issuing road and bridge bonds bearing
over 5 per cent interest, and sales of bonds below par are forbidden.1 6 Under such limitations non-negotiable municipal
bonds probably would not have been marketable. The market
for general fund bonds also would have been adversely affected
as the investing public has tended to associate the Pulaski
County situation with all county bonds.' 57 This result could
have been anticipated. Regardless of whether the Pulaski decision furnished any reasonable basis for doubting the negotiability of general fund bonds, investors simply have failed to differentiate between the two types of bonds, and, in addition, the
notorious publicity the case received created sn investment marWkets the impression that Kentucky regarded debt obligatwns

lightly.
Rehearnig and reversaZ.-The petition for rehearing of the
Pualski County case was promptly granted, and the Court reconsidered its original opinion on January 21, 1941. Appellees
ably contended that section 157a should not be considered an
(1Webster County v

Hall, 275 Ky. 54, 120 S. W

(2d) 756

)George W Peak, Negotiable Non-Negotiables, (Jan. 1942) 30
(
Ky L. J.179.

I"Louisville Courzer-Journal,Jan. 15, 1941.
'Acts 1914, chap. 80, sec. 21, p. 338; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936),
sec. 43017; Ky. Rev Stats., secs. 178.010, 178.170.
= This statement is confirmed by correspondence with brokerage
and investment restitutions.
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independent source of payment of road and bridge-bond obligations. The Court, however, persisted in holding that the county's liability was restricted to funds derived from the 20-cent
levy, but, although restricted in scope, under sections 158 and
159 of the Constitution its liability continued indefinitely into
time, hence, the pledge of its full faith and credit contained m
the bond recitals constituted an unconditional promise to pay
within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This
reasoning is evident m the conclusion of -the Court.
"Since Pulaski County could renew the bonds if not paid at
maturity, could use other available resources-at least at its optionand could because of the requirements of Section 159 of the Constitution be mandatorily required to continue the special levy beyond
the life of the bonds, we are of opinion that the payment of the
bonds cannot be said to be confined to a particular fund, hence that
they are negotiable instruments."
Perhaps it would be well to indicate certain social considerations pointed out by the Court. If section 157a is to be construed as being separate and independent of other constitutional provisions, as was done here, there is nothing in the constitutional provision or in section 4307 of the statutes making it
operative to indicate whether bonds issued under the authority
thereof are to be negotiable in character. In its quest for the
legislative intent, the Court remarked as follows.
'Itmay be observed that the legislature has frequently provided that obligations which would otherwise be clearly payable out
of particular funds shall be negotiable instruments."'
'Specific statutes making bonds of special municipal corporations and quasi-public corporations negotiable, though payable out
of particular funds are: Acts 1928, chap. 172, sec. 15, p. 565; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936), sec. 4356s-25; Ky. Rev. Stats. sec. 180.070;
Acts 1893, chap. 244, sec. 76, p. 1265 as amended by Acts 1926, chap.
115, sec. 67(k), p. 389; Carroll's Ky Stats. (1936), sec. 2839(k), Ky.
Rev. Stats., sec. 93.470; Acts 1894, chap. 100, art. IV, sec. 28, p. 234
as amended by Acts 1910, chap. 107, sec. 8, p. 306; Carroll's Ky.
Stats. (1936), sec. 3102; Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 94.470 (2), Acts 1932,
chap. 119, sec. 5, p. 116; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936), sec. 3480d-5; Ky.
Rev. Stats., sec. 96.520; Acts 1940,
chap. 120, sec. 8, p. 486; Carroll's
Ky. Stats. (1940 Supp.), sec. 2 741p-18; Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 97.160;
Acts 1938, chap. 92, sec. 3, p. 441; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1939 Supp.),
see. 3235i-3; Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 216.120; Acts 1934, chap. 72, sec. 4,
p. 370; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936), sec. 4535m-4; Ky. Rev. Stats., see.
162.350; Acts 1936, 4th ex. sess., chap. 6, sec. 16, p. 25; Carroll's Ky.
Stats. (1939 Supp.), see. 883j-17; Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 279.130; Acts
1936, chap. 110, sec. 3, p. 340; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936), sec. 938g-30;
Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 74.340; Acts 1934, chap. 113, sec. 10, p. 507; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1936), sec. 2741x-10; Ky. Rev. Stats., see. 80.230;
Acts 1936, 4th ex. sess., chap. 22, sec. 5, p. 166; Carroll's Ky. Stats.
(1939 Supp.), sec. 2948c-5; Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 165.150; Acts 1940,
chap. 148, sec. 41, p. 563; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1940 Supp.), sec.
2062g-41; Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 220.400.
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"Logic, history and custom all have their place in quest for the
legislative intent. We have taken cognizance of the fact that a large
issue of public bonds cannot be advantageously sold unless they are
negotiable.
We must weigh the purpose to be accomplished.
One is to dispose of the bonds for the best price. That cannot be
done if they do not possess all the qualities of negotiable instruments.
It is said that there are perhaps $20,000,000 of the bonds now
outstanding. It cannot be thought that the legislature intended that
so many obligations for such large sums should not have all
the
qualities, attributes and incidents of negotiable mstruments."'

Contractualrights of holders of road and brsdge bonds.What the contractual rights of holders df valid road and bridge
bonds would-be should the 20-cent levy prove inadequate, as is
the case in a few counties, has never been decided to the complete satisfaction of the investing public. The question was
raised in Gillis v. Anderson,160 but that portion of the lower
court's decision was stricken from the record as being irrelevant.
In the Pulaski case the implication is that the county is morally
obligated but that its legal liability does not extend beyond the
20-cent levy The moral implication is embodied in the following remark of the Court "The power to inecur an indebtedness
in the absence of something indicating the contrary implies the
power to assume personal liability
" The implied legal
limitations on the county's liability were indicated by way of
analogy with the opinion in Cornnrsstonersof Cleveland County
v. Citizens' National Bank,161 when the Court approvingly cited
the holding m that case to the effect that "though the taxing
power was limited it was general in the sense that it was all the
muicipality had." In other words, should the special 20-cent
levy prove inadequate, the county's liability is not absolved, but
the creditor is without immediately enforceable legal remedy
Reorgamzation of the debt structure of some counties will
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, until the extent of
county liability is definitely clarified. Bondholders generally
are reluctant to accede to any scaling down of par principal
amount of their bonds or to assent to any reductions in interest
rates until they have definite assurance that tns is necessary as
a compromise expedient, and it has been the experience of the
I The case of Hunter v. City of Louisville, 208 Ky. 326, 270
S. W 841 (1925) is cited.
1256 Ky. 472, 481, 76 S. W (2d) 279, 284 (1934).
100157 N. C. 191, 72 S. E. 996 (1911).
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local finance officer that some bondholders have steadfastly refused to consider any compromise proposal pending clarification
162
of their rights.
ESTOPPEL

Estoppej sn genera.--"Estoppel is founded on morality and
justice, and especially concerns conscience and equity "163 It is
the
predicated on the equitable rule that a person shall not deny
164
and
another,
of
prejudice
the
to
act
validity of his voluntary
is so called "because a man's own act or acceptance stoppeth or
1
closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth. " 65 From its
very nature the principle can be invoked only in those instances
where equity dictates. No hard and fast rule can be prescribed
governing its application, as this is necessarily contingent on the
existence of specific facts in each instance.
Under -what circumstances-if at all-counties, their
officials, or taxpayers may be estopped from denying the validity
of bond issues is difficult to ascertain. Bond recitals, though
frequently similar, are not necessarily uniform, and identical
conditions precedent to then issuance rarely if ever exist.
Any decision, then, as to whether bondholders may offer the
principle of estoppel in defense must be based on a studied
consideration of the facts in each particular case. Nevertheless,
because of the current significance of the issue, an examination
of its possible application cannot be evaded entirely on account
of the difficulties involved. The question recently was before the
Court of Appeals in the case of Morgan County v. Governor of
Kentucky, but no decision was given. It was remanded to the
county debt commission on a technicality 166 Subsequently, an
agreement has been reached without the estoppel question having
been decided. Meanwhile, refundings have been suspended in
several counties; 167 and the facility with which refinancing is
handled in many other counties ultimately will depend on the
position taken by the Court.
I Reeves, op. cit., p. 10.
1' 10 R. C. L. 690.
'"Lockhart v. Kentland Coal and Coke Co., 182 Ky. 673, 679,
207 S. W 18, 21 (1918).

112 Coke upon Littleton, sec. 667.
8Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky,

S. W (2d) 498 (1941).
'IfReeves, op. cit., p. 13.

288 Ky. 532, 156
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There is considerable litigation in other jurisdictions involving the principle of estoppel, but only five Kentucky cases directly involving the principle appear to have been reported. Only one
of these was by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the others were
'by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky Evidently, then, the issue is far from being settled.
If estoppel be applicable to Kentucky county bond litigation, it will relate generally, because of the prevailing character
of county indebtedness, to either of two propositions. (a)
whether the mode of performing the conditions precedent was
wrong in form or execution, and (b) whether debt limits have
been exceeded, in which case the power to issue is involved.
Of the two, the latter is of much greater practical significance,
as the amount of Kentucky county indebtedness of questionable
validity because of over-issue exceeds by far that.which may be
questioned because of procedural irregularities.
Estoppel tn pats. Apparently, the only decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals relative to a plea of estoppel in litigation relating to municipal bond issues was in 1883 in Town of
Eminence v. Grasser'sEx'r '(s Several instances may be cited
where the Court has made remarks which might be construed to
suggest either that a county may or may not be estopped from
denying the validity of its own acts or those of its officials,' 6 9
but many such remarks may be considered as mere obiter dicta
or as being so remotely related as to permit of distinction.
In the Eminence case the municipality relied on various
irregularities in the application for a submission of the proposition to subscribe to the taxpayers, in the advertisement, and time
of holding the election, and questioned the capacity of the officers
who held it and signed the bonds. The bondholder pleaded the
principle of estoppel. He contended that, in addition to the
recitals contained in the bonds sued on, the municipality gave
"' 81 Ky. 52.
"' Representative instances are cited as follows: Cook v. Lyon
County, 13 Ky. Opinions 81, 83 (1884), Long v. McDowell, 107 Ky.
14, 18, 52 S. W 812, 813 (1899), Greene County v. Shortell, 116 Ky.
108, 75 S. W 251 (1903), Gray v. Jackson County Board of Education, 205 Ky. 277, 280, 265 S. W 772, 774 (1924), Burnside Land Co.
v. Connelly & Lee, 218 Ky. 346, 350, 291 S. W 409, 411 (1926); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. City of Paris, 248 Ky. 252, 258, 58 S. W (2d)
361, 363 (1933); City of Paducah v. Gillispie, 273 Ky. 101, 115 S. W
(2d) 574 (1938), Pulaski County v Ben Hur Life Association, 286
Ky. 119, 126, 149 S. W (2d) 738, 742.
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other representations of their validity by levying and collecting
taxes, and paying thereby nearly three-fourths of the issue.
The acts were held to constitute a basis for estoppel. The Court
also refused to permit the city to deny the official character of
its own officers who acted as such in the performance of the duties
necessary to execute the conditions precedent to the issuance of
the bonds.
Whether the Eminence case is controlling in Kentucky
courts is not known. Should the courts see fit to apply the
doctrine there asserted, there is little doubt that Kentucky
counties are estopped from questiomug the validity of bonds
where the mode of performing the conditions precedent was
wrong rn form or execution. The case also offers persuasive
evidence that bonds invalid in their inception may become valid
170
by subsequent ratification.
The writer has been unalile to find an opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals directly deciding the proposition as to
whether or not county officials acting beyond constitutional
limitations by making untrue recitals in the face of bonds can
estop the county from questioning the validity of bonds because
of over-issue.' 7 ' The only decisions in this respect have been in
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky
In each of those instances the counties were estopped from pleading invalidity
The first federal decisions relative to a plea of estoppel,
where Kentucky county bonds were the subject of litigation,
were in 1909, in Dsetrzch v. Bath County, Kentucky"' 2 and its
companion case, George A. Eyer and Co. v. Mercer County, Kentuccy."Y3 The Bath County case will be discussed to the
exclusion of the Mercer County case, because the latter, as a
companion case, relied on the reasoning employed in the former.
The Bath County case involved the validity of $21,045.49 of
bonds and interest coupons thereon out of an issue of $23,500,
dated July 1, 1900, and issued under section 1857 of Kentucky
'To the contrary, however, see Board of Education of Calloway County v. Talbott, 261 Ky. 66, 76, 86 S. W (2d) 1059, 1064-65
(1935), Whitley County v. Hermann, 263 Ky. 440, 444, 92 S. W (2d)
797-799 (1936).
" Appellees m their brief of June 7, 1941 inthe case of Morgan
County
v. Governor of Kentucky make the same admission.
iT 292 Fed. 279 (E. D. Ky. 1909).
292 Fed. 292 (E. D. Ky. 1923).

KENTUcKy LAw JouRNAL
Statutes, providing for the funding of a county's indebtedness
contracted for public buildings, bridges, and turnpikes. The
bonds were issued to fund indebtedness created during the fiscal
year 1892 for the construction of turnpikes. The funded debt
was averred to be invalid because it was in excess of the income
and revenues provided for the year and was created in violation
of section 157 of the Constitution without having been submitted
to a vote of the people. Total revenues for the year amounted to
$20,022.43, and, during the year previous to the creation of the
indebtedness that was funded, an indebtedness of $12,000 had
been incurred for current annual expenses. This left a surplus
of only $8,022.43 applicable to other legitimate purposes.
In holding that the county was estopped to claim that the funded
indebtedness was invalid, Judge Cochran reasoned.
"The Legislature had power to confer on the fiscal court power
to fund such indebtedness. Undoubtedly said section should be construed to confer power to fund only such indebtedness as has been
legally incurred. But it must also be construed as conferring
power on the fiscal court to determine what of its county's indebtedness is legal and to make representation in regard thereto by way
of recital in the funding bonds. There is no statute in Kentucky
providing for semi-annual or other statements setting forth
the amount of the indebtedness of the county, much less the facts
upon which its legality may be determined, so that the amount and
legality thereof may be readily ascertained by the purchaser of its
funding bonds. To determine the amount of the indebtedness and
the character thereof, he must search the minutes of the fiscal court,
any reports that may have been made to it, and the accounts of the
court's treasurer, and to determine its legality he will have to investigate carefully all steps in order to its occurrence. If a purchaser has to go to that much trouble and cannot safely rely on the
determination of the fiscal court and its representation made by way
of recital in the bonds issued by it, there will be very few funding
bonds sold. Hence there can be no question that under this provision
the fiscal court of the defendant had power to determine and make
representation by way of recital in the bonds in question as to the
validity of the indebtedness which they were issued to fund."

In a recent decision, Woodmen of the World v. Rowan
County, Kentuckyir 4 Judge Swmnford applied the rule stated
above and held that counties which have the power to issue bonds
also have implied authority to determine the existence of necessary facts as a condition precedent. He distinguished clearly
between a complete lack of power to issue bonds under all
circumstances and the power to issue them if certain conditions
exist.
1 23 F Supp. 903 (E. D. Ky. 1938).
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The most recent case in federal courts was Women's
case
it was contended that Carroll County bonds issued in 1928 under
authority of sections 157, 158, and 159 of the Constitution and
sections 1$57, 1858, and 1859 of Kentucky statutes to fund floatmg indebtedness were in excess of debt limitations. Judge Ford,
in answer to this contention, said.

Catholic Order of Forestersv. Carroll Couinty.175 In tis

"The defense asserted is in direct contradiction of the recitals
made by the Fiscal Court in its resolution authorizing the issuance
of the bonds and seeks to repudiate the certificate incorporated in

each of them. It does not rest upon the clain of total lack of power
in the county, under any and all circumstances, to issue funding
bonds of the character here involved, but rests upon claimed lack
of power resulting from the absence of precedent facts which conditioned its exercise. The distinction between a defense based upon

total lack of power and one based merely upon the absence of
precedent facts or conditions upon winch the exercise of a conferred
power depended, has been so frequently stated that it is no longer
open to question in this jurisdiction. At the time these bonds were

issued, the Fiscal Court of the County, having jurisdiction to 'regulate and control the fiscal affairs' of the county (Sections 1840 and
428lu-i to 428lu-4, inclusive, Kentucky Statutes), was clothed with
authority and charged with the duty of determining whether. there
had been a fulfillment of the precedent conditions essential to the
lawful exercise of the power conferred by the Statutes and the Con-

stitution."

The Morgan County case, the only case involving the
particular issue ever to have been squarely before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, relates to the validity of road and bridge
bonds alleged to have been issued in excess of constitutional
limitations. Refunding bonds for Morgan County were approved by the state local finance officer on the theory that the
county is estopped from denying the validity of the bonds
because of recitals in the face thereof alleging in effect the
contrary A protesting taxpayer appealed to the county debt
commission and that body overruled the decision of the state
local finance officer. The action of the commission was based on
an opinion given by Assistant Attorney General A. E. Funk,
pursuant to Section 938q-4 of the County Debt Act, to the effect
that a taxpayer would not be estopped by any recital in bonds to
question the validity thereof. 176 Morgan County is resting its
case largely on the principles discussed previously in connection
with the decisions where Kentucky counties have been estopped
17334

F Supp. 140 (E.D. Ky 1940).

=e See consolidated original and reply briefs of appellants at
pp. 2-4.
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from pleading invalidity of their bond issues. The contention of
the county debt commission briefly is as follows.
"It is the contention of the Attorney General that the $11,000 of
(the Morgan County issue) which exceeded the amount that could
have been liquidated in forty years was void ab %nitio;that being
void ab initio, neither Morgan County nor her fiscal court could by
any act, trick, pretense, device or subterfuge pay such said excess

bond issue or any part thereof or obligate Morgan County so to do.
The reason for this contention is the plain unvarnished fact that
under the provisions of sections 157, 157a, and 159 of the State Constitution, neither Morgan County nor its fiscal court had the power
to assume its payment after its attempted creation; and not having
the power to either create or assume the indebtedness, any act looking to that end, even presuming that a county is a corporation
(wich it is not) and that the fiscal court are its corporate officers,
such an act ' 7or acts would come under the well known doctrine of
ultra vires."

In support of the above contentions advanced by appellees
it is of interest to note the following arguments and footnoted
cases cited in support thereof (a) It is the inescapable duty of
those contracting with or purchasing the obligations of a county
to take notice of the law and the authority of the county to
contract thereunders (b) Parties contracting with or purchasing obligations of fiscal courts do so at their peril.179 (c)
The fiscal court has no power when issuing against the county
void obligations prohibited by the Constitution, to estop the
county, its officers, or taxpayers from resisting the payment of
those obligations on constitutional grounds by the fraudulent
device of inserting fake statements in the face of those obliga'Appellees' Brief, pp. 2-3.
"U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Commonwealth, 31 R. 1179,
1180, 104 S. W 1029 (1907), Grinstead v. Monroe County, 156 Ky.
296, 298, 160 S. W 1041, 1042 (1913) Leslie County v. Keith, 227
Ky. 663, 664, 13 S. W (2d) 1012, 1013 (1929), Farmer v. Marr, 238
Ky. 417, 426, 38 S. W (2d) 209, 212 (1931), Fulton County Fiscal
Court v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 36,
146 S. W (2d) 15, 25 (1940)
"Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 36, 146 S. W (2d) 15, 25 (1940); Farmer
v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417, 426, 38 S. W (2d) 209, 212 (1931); Leslie
County v. Keith, 227 Ky. 663, 664, 13 S. W (2d) 1012, 1013 (1929),
Grmstead v. Monroe County, 156 Ky. 296, 298, 160 S. W 1041, 1042
(1913), Bruner v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 239 Ky. 613, 617,
40 S. W (2d) 271, 273 (1931), Crick v. Rash, 190 Ky. 820, 825, 229
S. W 63, 65 (1921), Owen County v. Walker, 141 Ky. 516, 520, 133
S. W 236, 238 (1911); Jefferson County v. Young, 120 Ky. 456, 462,

86 S. W 985, 986 (1905), Board of Church Extension M. E. Church

South v. Taylor, 152 Ky. 518, 519, 153 S. W 747, 748 (1913) Pulaski
County v. Richardson, 225 Ky 556, 566, 9 S. W (2d) 523, 526 (1928).
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tions. 18 0 (d) The holders of a void bond have no right against
the county that issued the bond. 18 1 In addition to these contentions of appellees the Court of Appeals has repeatedly held any
debt created in excess of constitutional debt limits is void.
Finally, it should be observed that the bonds in each of the
cases referred to where the decision has permitted invoking
estoppel were issued.prior to legislative enactment in 1934 providing expressly that any county may not be estopped from con82
testing the legality of any indebtedness winch it has created.'
Apparently, recitals in bonds issued subsequent to 1934 are of
little force. The same might be suggested respecting bonds
issued since 1932, when the legislature provided for court
validation, 188 as judicial approval should dispel any fears
relative to statements contained in bond recitals. The truth of
such statements having once been judicially determined should
in the absence of fraud withstand collateral attack in subsequent
proceedings. Prior to tins time, however, there is presumptive
evidence that counties might be so estopped. The tenor of the
Court's decisions appears to have been that municipal indebtedness, in the absence of definite evidence to the contrary, is
presumed to be valid, and in all instances the burden of proof
is on the party who challenges the validity thereof. 18 4
'Sutliff v. Board of County Commissioners, 147 U. S. 230, 235,
236-237, 37 Law. Ed. 145, 148, 149 (1893), Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184
U. S., 302, 319, 46 Law. Ed. 564 (1902), Dixon Co. v. Field, 111 U. S.
83, 28 Law. Ed. 360 (1884) Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Association, 286 Ky. 119, 127, 137, 149 S. W (2d) 738, 742, 747; Whitley
County v. Hermann, 263 Ky. 440, 444, 92 S. W (2d) 797, 799 (1936)
City of Henderson v. Redman, 185 Ky. 146, 150, 214 S. W 809, 810
(1919) In Re Town of Afton (No. 6710) 43 Okla. 720, 726, 144 Pac.
184, 187, 188 (1914).
" Downmg v. Mason County, 87 Ky 208, 212, 8 S. W 264, 266
(1899), Kentucky State Park Commission v Wilder, 260 Ky. 190,
194, 84 S. W (2d) 38, 40 (1935), Carr v. Jefferson County, 275 Ky
685, 687, 122 S. W (2d) 482, 484 (1936)
'Acts 1934, chap. 132, p. 544; Carroll's Ky. Stats., sec. 1649c-1;
Ky. Rev. Stats., sec. 422.140.
"Acts 1932, chap. 22, secs. 1, 2, p. 124; Acts 1936, chap. 21, sec.
1, p. 58; Carroll's Ky. Stats., 186c-6, 186c-7; Ky. Rev. Stats., secs.
66.260-.270. City of Newport v. The Newport National Bank, 148
Ky. 213, 146 S. W 377 (1912), McDonald v. City of Lexington, 253
Ky. 585, 70 S. W (2d) 534 (1934), Ballard County v. Kentucky
County Debt Commission, 290 Ky. 770, 162 S.'W (2d) 771 (1942)
' See, for example, Fox v. Boyle County, 245 Ky. 27, 31, 53
S. W (2d) 192, 194 (1932), Rhode v. City of Newport, 246 Ky 476,
481, 55 S. W (2d) 368, 370 (1932), Kentucky Utilities Co. v. City of
Paris, 248 Ky. 252, 258, 58 S. W (2d) 361, 363 (1933).
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III. CoNCLusIONs
The constitutional debt limitations of 1890 were designed to
prevent Kentucky counties from incurring indebtedness during
any year in excess of the income and revenue provided for the
year and to limit indebtedness for extraordinary expenditures
and capital outlays to 2 per cent of assessed valuation. The
latter was extended in 1909 to permit indebtedness up to 5 per
cent of assessed value when incurred for road and bridge
purposes. Judicial constructions of these provisions, however,
have resembled the swing of a pendulum. For several years the
progressively increasing laxity in the Court's decisions went a
long way toward removing all restraining influences of -the
Constitution, but the current tendency of the Court apparently
is to revert to a stricter interpretation more in accord with the
meaning of the original instrument. Taken chronologically the
trend of the Court's decisions may be summarized briefly as
follows Initially, non-voted general fund indebtedness was
limited to include only voluntary contractual obligations,
expenditures for essential governmental purposes were thus
effectively excluded from any restraints. Soon thereafter, the
restraining influence of the annual income and revenue limitation was practically nullified when it was decided that the
amount of indebtedness which a county could lawfully create
was to be measured by the maximum permissible tax levy and
100 per cent collections and not by the actual levy with proper
allowance for probable delinquencies. For about two decades,
then, the Court attempted to follow this basically unsound
decision to its logical conclusion, first, by authorizing counties
to forward general fund deficits to succeeding years for payment, second, by sanctioning the funding of these accumulated
deficits. Meanwhile, many counties through their failure to act
in good faith abused the administrative freedom and discretion
permitted them and became indiscrinmnately involved in debt.
Culmination of the increasingly liberal interpretatons of the
Court has been followed by progressively stricter and more
limited constructions tending to invalidate the obligations of
many counties. As a result, some counties have been forced to
resort to such expedients as attempted repudiation, proration
of available funds, compromise agreements, and, it may be, to
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voluntary bankruptcy, others have escaped legal hurdles
through refinancing at reduced interest rates, delayed maturity
dates, etc. Apparently, no solution is in sight for a few.
Inconsistencies m the Court's decisions have tended to
aggravate the situation. Before any refunding plan can be
arranged, a prodigious amount of detailed investigation must be
done. Even then, because of the diversity m judicial precedents,
refinancing cannot be done with complete assurance that there
will be compliance with all legal requirements.
Most judicial controversies have tended to gravitate around
certain fundamental constitutional issues. These may be presented as follows Does the general 50-cent levy measure the
extent of county liability for general fund obligations-both
voted and non-voted, or is it mandatory upon counties under
section 159 of the Constitution to exceed the 50-cent levy, if
necessary, to service valid obligations* Are constitutional
limitations on county indebtedness self-executing, or may the
legislature and local governing bodies impose additional limitations within prescribed limits? Is section 157a to be construed
as an extension and an integral part of section 157, or is it to be
interpreted as being distinctly separate? Varying constructions
of these basic issues have resulted in much litigation which, in
turn, has been responsible for many delays and additional
expense in refinancing operations and has tended to destroy the
confidence of the investing public generally in Kentucky. muincipal bonds. Likewise, much additional litigation appears inevitable before any measure of harmony can be brought out of the
chaotic conditions thus created. In tins connection it might be
suggested that social and economic implications may be given
considerable weight in future decisions, at least curreift opinions
offer persuasive evidence to this effect.
Finally, the policy followed by the state local finance officer
of insisting that all doubtful legal questions be resolved by the
courts is a controversial issue. This may be the only sane and
constructive policy that could have been adopted, but, from the
standpoint of getting the job done, the propriety of pressing
adjudication of all doubtful issues may be questionable.
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